Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2

Article 5

1996

Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries
of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Ben Cristal

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cristal, Ben (1996) "Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the Americans with Disabilities Act," Hofstra Labor and
Employment Law Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss2/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Cristal: Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the American

NOTES

GOING BEYOND THE JUDICIALLY
PRESCRIBED BOUNDARIES OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act")', an
employer unlawfully discriminates where it fails to make "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business
of such covered entity."2 This Note focuses on those accommodations
that would require substantial financial undertakings on the part of the
employer.
To properly analyze the effectiveness of the ADA, this Note
considers what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation," who is a
"qualified individual with a disability," and what constitutes "undue
hardship" in light of the policy and legislative history of the ADA. The
Note then suggests an efficient, cost effective financing method that
implements the ADA in a more equitable manner that also protects a
greater percentage of the disabled population than the present administration of the Act.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).
2. Id. § 12112(b)(S)(A).
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II.

THE POLICY OF THE ADA

The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with

disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and
social mainstream of American life; to provide enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to
ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing
these standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities.3
Specifically, the relevant legislative policy is that there "exists a
compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of
employment in the private sector .... ,4
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources submitted
a report that points to five reasons why such legislation is necessary to
mainstream America's disabled into the workforce as well as other facets
of society:
(1) Historically, individuals with disabilities have been isolated and
subjected to discrimination and such isolation and discrimination
is still pervasive in our society;
(2) Discrimination still persists in such critical areas as employment
in the private sector, public accommodations, public services,
transportation, and telecommunications;
(3) Current Federal and State laws are inadequate to address the
discrimination faced by people with disabilities in these critical
areas;
(4) People with disabilities as a group occupy an inferior status
socially, economically, vocationally, and educationally; and
(5) Discrimination denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and costs the United States, State and
local governments, and the private sector billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity.5
The disabled are subject to the prejudices and evils of society

3. H.1. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 22-23 (1990).
4. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1989).
5. Id. at 6.
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seemingly more so than any other minority group in America. 6 This
discrimination costs our economy "between $200 billion and $300 billion
a year in support payments and lost productivity by not using the skills
and talents of workers with disabilities." 7 When Congress was considering the ADA, the common practice of excluding the disabled from the
workplace was uncovered. The levels of unemployment among this
neglected group of Americans is staggering.8 According to one survey,
"[tiwo-thirds of all disabled Americans between the ages of [sixteen] and
[sixty-four were] not working," although a large majority of them wanted
to work.' This translated into approximately 8.2 million disabled
Americans who wanted to work and could not find a job.'0 The
disabled community is not a class of people that wants to live off the
taxpayer, but rather a class that wants to be part of the productive
machinery of this country." In fact, eighty-two percent of the disabled
have said that they would give up the government benefits that they
receive in exchange for a full-time job.' 2 Today, the statistics are no
more encouraging: sixty-five percent of those who are disabled are unem3 although sixty percent of the disabled would prefer to have a
ployed
4
job.1
The Senate's report on the ADA also revealed that many employers
have unfounded fears.' 5 The disabled were believed to cause the
employer's insurance to dramatically increase, necessitate workplace
adjustments at considerable expense, jeopardize safety records, require
special privileges, and result in other employees objecting to working
with the disabled employees.' 6 The report noted that "[t]he continuing
effect of mistaken stereotypes across the spectrum of employers, in both
small and large enterprises, is likely the single greatest factor in keeping
most working age adults with disabilities out of the economic mainstream
6. Id. at 8-9.
7. Tony Coelho, DisabilitiesLaws Work, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 4, 1995, (Letters to the
Editor), at A12. Tony Coelho is chairman of the President's Committee on Employment of People

with Disabilities. Id.
8. 135 CONG. REC. S10791 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
9. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 9.
10. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 9.
11. See S. REP. No. 116, supranote 4, at 9.
12. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 9.
13. Disabled Still Fight For Rights Five Years After ADA, There's A Lot Of Work Left,
SYRACUSE HERALD-J., July 26, 1995, (Editorial), at A12.
14. Marta Russell, Is It Time To Reform the Americans with DisabilitiesAct? Act Counters

Decades of Abuses, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 6, 1995, at G3.
15. S. REP. NO. 116, supra note 4, at 28.'
16. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 28.
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of our Nation."17
The Senate's report, however, concluded that there is no merit to
any of these contentions.' To support this conclusion, the report noted
a 1973 study in which the performances of 1,452 disabled E.I. duPont de
Nemours and Company employees were examined. 9 The study
dispelled employers' common misconceptions about the supposed
inadequacies of disabled employees.2z In particular, the study found
that ninety-one percent of the disabled employees at DuPont rated
average or better in performance; only four percent of the disabled
workers had safety records that were below average while more than half
were above average; ninety-three percent of the disabled employees rated
average or better than average with respect to job stability; and seventynine percent of the disabled workers had an average or better than
average attendance record.21 The study also found that "[f]ellow
employees did not resent necessary accommodations made for employees
with disabilities."'
The ADA had very noble beginnings. It attempted to do for
disabled Americans what Title VII has accomplished for the other
American groups who traditionally have been the victims of discrimination.23 The ADA covers a very large percentage of the disabled
community.' However, most of these individuals are not necessarily
the members of the disabled community that are the most difficult to
assist. In 1982, one study revealed that seventy-eight percent of disabled
employees needed no accommodations at all.2 5 This left only twentytwo percent of employees who required special accommodations, of
which a full fifty-one percent could be achieved at no cost and thirty
percent would cost under $500 per worker.26 The class of disabled
employees requiring these workplace modifications is not difficult to
accommodate and requires relatively little employer expense.2 ' However, fearful of the ramifications of the ADA on their businesses, employ-

17. 135 CONG.

REc. S10798 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon).

18. See S. REP.No. 116, supra note 4, at 28.
19. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 28-29.
20. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 28-29.
21. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 29.
22. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 29.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (Supp. V 1994).

24. See generally 135 CONG. REC. S10790 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
25. Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv.
923, 930 [hereinafter Tucker].
26. Id.

27. Id.
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ers, in making eipenditures associated with complying with the ADA,
28
have sometimes actually spent more than they had to.
These statistics have not changed much five years after the passage
of the ADA. Recently, Sears commissioned a study concerning the cost
to employers of reasonable accommodations.2 9 The study indicated that
of 436 reasonable accommodations provided by Sears, only three percent
cost more than $1,000 while twenty-eight percent of the accommodations
cost less than $1,000 and a full sixty-nine percent cost nothing at all.30
It is this majority of disabled employees, those requiring little or no
accommodations, who have been well protected and have been afforded
the benefits of the statute such as being better equipped to use the court
system to challenge employers in a manner similar to the litigation of
Title VII violations."
This Note focuses on the minority of disabled employees who need
accommodations where the cost may be quite significant. This is the
class of Americans whom the courts have abandoned. Senator Harkin,
during a debate for the passage of the Act, eloquently stated that "[ilt
makes no sense for a talented person who has skills to contribute, to sit
idly at home receiving [government assistance]."32 The above mentioned minority of individuals among the disabled community is the class
of Americans not benefiting from the current interpretation of the ADA.
The unfortunate fact is that five years after the enactment of the ADA,
employment opportunities for the disabled have not greatly increased.33
"The ADA has not brought lots of people into the mainstream of the
work force. 34 In fact, according to a recent national poll taken by
Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., very little improvement has been made
in adding more disabled people into the workplace.3
As will be
shown, the courts have made it very difficult for these individuals,

28. Francine Knowles, DisabilitiesLaw Sparks Changeand Complaints, CHi. SUN-TIMES, July
30, 1995, at 31.
29. Janet Reno & Dick Thornburgh, ADA - Not a Disabling Mandate, WALL ST. J., July 26,

1995, at A12.
30. Id.

31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. V 1994).
32. 135 CONG. REc. S10773 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
33. Jan C. Greenburg & Wilma Randle, Law Gave DisabledRamps, Not Jobs, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 30, 1995, at Al.
34. Id. (quoting Kathryn Shane McCarty, associate staff director of the American Bar
Association's Committee on Mental and Physical Disabilities Law).
35. Jay Mathews, Most CorporateLeaders SupportDisabilitiesAct; PollReveals LittleIncrease
In Actual Hiring,WASH. POST, July 14, 1995, at B3.
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although intended to be protected by the ADA, 36 to be able to compete
in the workplace.
II.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

The ADA does not specifically define the term "reasonable
accommodation" although section 12111(9) of the Act sets forth several
examples that are consistent with the philosophy of reasonable accommodation. 37 These examples include: making existing facilities readily
accessible to and usable by people with disabilities; job restructuring;
developing part-time or modified work schedules; reassigning employees
to vacant positions; acquiring or modifying equipment; modifying or
adjusting examinations, training materials, and/or policies; and providing
qualified readers or interpreters for blind or deaf employees. 3' The
legal obligation for an employer to provide these accommodations is
limited to the extent at which these accommodations would cause the
employer undue hardship.39
A majority of disabled Americans do not require any accommodations to perform the essential job functions of the positions they seek. 0
Thus, equal opportunity and treatment is relatively inexpensive to achieve
among these Americans.4 ' It is the disparity of treatment between
people with lesser and people with greater degrees of disability that
requires correction, so that all disabled Americans receive equal treatment
and society achieves the desired equal impact among all who are
disabled.
A.

Reasonable Accommodation and Substantial Modification

To properly understand the reasons for the varying coverages among
the different classes of disabled employees under the ADA, it is
necessary to determine the standards courts have applied in deciding
when modifications that enable disabled employees to meet the

36. Based on the legislative history of the ADA, it appears that Congress intended to give all
those disabled individuals who wanted to work the opportunity to work. See S. REP. No. 116, supra
note 4, at 2; 135 CONG. REc. 510791 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1994). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (1995).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p). For a description of
what constitutes an undue hardship, see infra part III.C.
40. Tucker, supra note 25, at 930.
41. See Tucker, supra note 25, at 930.
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employer's standards cross the line separating reasonable accommodations from affirmative action. In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,42 the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between "reasonable accommodation" and affirmative action.43 Davis did not involve
the ADA,44 but it did require the Court to interpret the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation" under the Rehabilitation Act. 5 "Reasonable accommodation" under the ADA is modeled after the statutory
definition under the Rehabilitation Act and the judicial interpretations of
the Rehabilitation Act.46
In Davis, a licensed practical nurse brought an action under the
Rehabilitation Act against a college that denied her admission into its
registered nursing program due to her hearing disability.4 7 Commenting
on the interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), the Court held that "[a]lthough
an agency's interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled
to some deference, 'this deference is constrained by our obligation to
honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language,
purpose, and history."' 4" The Court held further that "neither the
language, purpose, nor history of [section] 504 reveals an intent to
impose an affirmative-action obligation... [and] even if HEW has
attempted to create such an obligation itself, it lacks the authority to do
so. ' 4 9 The Court then labeled the student's suggested remedies
"substantial modifications" and ruled that modifications reaching this
level were not among those warranted by the Rehabilitation Act.5"

42. 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (holding that a registered nurse training program need not make
substantial modifications to its program in order to reasonably accommodate a handicapped

applicant).
43. Id. at 407-11.

44. Id. at 400.
45. See id. at 408-11.
46. See, e.g., Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before Subcomm. on
the Handicappedof the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 10 1st Cong., IstSess. 54
(1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (arguing that "to the extent possible that this legislation can track
settled law, settled Supreme Court interpretation, settled regulations, that is what we are going to
do."). See also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 62. Since its enactment, very little case law
has developed under the ADA. Janet Reno & Dick Thomburgh, ADA - Not a DisablingMandate,
WALL ST. J.,July 26, 1995, at A12. "The Justice Department and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, together, have averaged fewer than 25 suits during each of the past five
years." Id. There have been only 650 ADA cases nationwide. Id.
47. Davis, 442 U.S. at 400-02.
48. Id. at 411 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20

(1979)).
49. Id. at 411-12.
50. Id. at 413.
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The Davis decision, although not stated with complete clarity,"
initiated a series of decisions that consistently differentiated between
"reasonable accommodations" and affirmative action. 2 Although the
distinction has been followed by the courts, 3 the distinction is certainly
not clear. The Davis Court did not enunciate a bright line rule to
distinguish affirmative action or substantial modification from reasonable
accommodation, and subsequent decisions have failed to clarify the
issue.14 The Davis decision and its progeny allow no room for consistency of judgments because of the vagueness of the term "substantial
modification." So when does an accommodation cross the line separating
"reasonable" from "substantial"?
The Davis Court's ruling has effectively divided the handicapped
population into two classes: those who require less than substantial
modifications by an employer and are thus protected under the ADA, and
those who require substantial modifications and are therefore denied
protection under the ADA. Although the Davis Court found that any
modifications to the program would be of no assistance to the student,"s
the Court's ruling also declared that it was unnecessary for the college
to modify the nursing program, as suggested by the student, because the
suggestions comprised substantial modifications 5that
the college was not
6
obligated to make under the Rehabilitation Act.
Examples given in the ADA itself question the applicability of the
Davis Court's reasoning to the ADA. First, some of the ADA's
examples of a reasonable accommodation include providing qualified
readers or interpreters for the blind or the deaf, job restructuring, and
modifying work schedules.5 7 Thus, for the school to provide an
interpreter or supervisor to the student and to modify the curriculum (as
an employer would restructure a job or modify a schedule) would be

51. Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardshipin the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 1423, 1434 n.60 (1991) [hereinafter Cooper].

52. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987) (noting
that the duty of an employer does not include affirmative action, but "an affirmative obligation to
make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee"); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 300 n.20 (1985) (narrowing the Davis decision by holding that reasonable accommodations do

not require the employer to make substantial modifications or to fundamentally alter the nature of
a program).

53. Cooper, supranote 51, at 1434-35 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20; Arline, 480 U.S.
at 289 n.19).
54. See supra note 52.
55. Davis, 442 U.S. at 409.
56. Id. at 413-14.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. V 1994).
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perfectly consistent with the plain meaning of the Act.58 The facts of
Davis classically exemplify the situation that Congress envisioned when
it drafted the definition of "reasonable accommodation." However,
contrary to Congress' intended judicial interpretation of reasonable
accommodation, the Davis Court reasoned that the student's participation
in the program would substantially lower the school's standards.5 9
While it is true that Davis was decided before the enactment of the ADA,
it is still controlling when determining what accommodations are
substantial and, thus, unreasonable.
The school's responsibility under the Rehabilitation Act to make
reasonable accommodations to the student60 should have been sufficient
for the Court to find that the burden placed upon the school was
warranted due to the nature of the accommodations. In the lower court
decision in Davis, the Fourth Circuit, which based its decision on Section
504, stated that Southeastern "must reconsider plaintiff's application for
admission 1to the nursing program without regard to her hearing
6
disability.
The proposition of the Davis Court is correct in that "reasonable
accommodation" should mean equal opportunity, not affirmative
action,62 but the standard was misapplied and the relief being sought by
the student was mislabeled. As a result of the Davis decision, accommodations 'which courts interpret as substantial modifications will now be
rejected as unreasonable accommodations. 63 Because it has been held
that awarding certain affirmative action is not within the province of the
courts, 64 employers have relied heavily on convincing the courts that the
accommodation sought by the employee would be a substantial
modification and therefore cause an undue hardship.
Here, it seems applying the Davis Court's decision undermines the

58. See id.
59. Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.

60. Id. at 405.
61. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158,1160 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442

U.S. 397 (1979).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (Supp. V 1994); H.R. REp. NO. 485, supra note 3, at 65
(commenting that "the reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a process in
which barriers to a particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed.").

63. Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.
64. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-11.
65. See Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1284 (8th Cir. 1985); Jasany v. United States Postal
Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1985); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473,478 (1lth Cir.
1983).
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intended policy of the ADA." Under Davis, where individuals have
more severe handicaps or handicaps more difficult to accommodate,
courts will deem these modifications substantial. The labeling of an
accommodation as a substantial modification 67 will also deny the
disabled applicant access to the workplace; thus the individual will be
systematically excluded from the protective umbrella of the ADA.
Enforcement of the ADA in this manner has the effect of treating
handicapped individuals unequally, not as compared to non-disabled
Americans, but among themselves. The Court's use of the "substantial
modification" rule as defined in the Davis decision gives employers an
excuse to treat different handicapped individuals unequally. It is difficult
to imagine that Congress only intended to cover those handicapped
individuals who are most convenient to cover.6
In addition to an employer's ability to escape the mandates of the
ADA by a showing that the accommodation is unreasonable because it
amounts to a substantial modification,69 the employer has two other
avenues to avoid hiring a handicapped individual who requires accommodation or modification.7 °
B.

Qualified Individual with a Handicap and Essential Job Function

An employer need only accommodate a "qualified individual with
a disability."' A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined in
section 12111(8) of the ADA as "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."72 Essential job functions under the ADA are those functions
that are "fundamental and not marginal. 7M An employee must be able
to perform essential job functions "unaided or with the assistance of a
reasonable accommodation." '74 In an attempt to avoid giving the

66. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2.
67. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.
68. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2. The report speaks of a policy addressing
discrimination against handicapped individuals. S. REp. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2. It most
certainly does not imply only addressing the discrimination that effects the less severely handicapped
population. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2.
69. See Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413.
70. Cooper, supra note 51, at 1441-42.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).

72. Id.; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 25-26; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995).
73. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 26; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

74. Hutchinson v. West, No. 03940051, 1995 WL 215407, at *4 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 1995).
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employer complete control in this area, the employer's determination of
what constitutes an essential job function is merely given consideration
by the courts.75 Petitioners may offer evidence such as the amount of
time spent on the job performing the function to dispute the employer's
position regarding a particular duty.76 The reason not to give the
employer more control in this area is obvious - there is a predisposition
for employers to save money - and if an employer is faced with spending
money to make an accommodation, the employer may be tempted to
label as essential job functions those duties that common sense would
label as only marginal at best. 77 Congress' refusal to give employers
carte blanche in deciding essential job functions does not undermine the
employer's right to freely choose the applicant who the employer feels
can do the best job.78 Congress seems to have reached a commendable
compromise in this area.79
The meaning of "essential job functions" comes from judicial
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act. 0 While it is true that a court
must give consideration to what an employer considers an essential job
function," a court's fact-specific inquiry should "be based upon more
than statements in a job description and should reflect the actual
' 82
functioning and circumstances of the particular enterprise involved.
After the inquiry, the court - not the employer - determines what job
functions are essential.8 3
Nelson v. Thornburgh was a seminal case that defined the phrase
"essential job function." 84 In Nelson, the court noted that a job function
may be labeled essential simply because employees previously holding
the position had done it in the past.85 "It is possible to envision
situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and

75. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55.

76. See Hutchinson, 1995 WL 215407 at *4.
77. Cooper, supra note 51, at 1442.
78. Cooper, supra note 51, at 1442.
79. Cooper, supra note 51, at 1442-43.

80. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55.
81. Tuck v. HCA Health Serv., 7 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 1993). The court held that the
employer hospital had not discharged its obligation to make reasonable accommodations. Id. at 474.
82. Id. at 472 (quoting Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988));
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1995).
83. Tuck, 7 F.3d at 472 (citing Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir.

1988)).
84. 567 F. Supp. 369, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that blind income maintenance workers
were otherwise qualified for the positions), af'd,732 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,469 U.S.

1188 (1985).
85. See id. at 378.
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practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped
86
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program."
In a subsequent case, Jackson v. Veterans Admin.," an insightful
dissent contested the majority's application of the "otherwise qualified"
language in regard to essential job functions.8 8 The majority held that
unpredictable absences that were the result of the individual's handicap
could not be reasonably accommodated and therefore the plaintiff could
not be considered a qualified individual with a disability.89 The dissent
first reasoned that the unpredictability of the plaintiff's absenteeism was
90
irrelevant because he had not exhausted all of his allotted sick days.
More importantly, the dissent stated that predictability of the plaintiff's
presence at work was not an essential job function.9' When deciding
whether a handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified," Judge Birch
suggested that the reviewing court must employ a two prong analysis. 92
The court must first make a determination of whether the individual can
perform the essential job functions of the position.93 If the court finds
that the applicant cannot, then it must determine if the applicant could
94
perform these functions with the aid of a reasonable accommodation.
The dissent's approach looks more deeply into what constitutes an
essential job function. It is easy to label as an essential job function an
aspect of a position that at first glance seems important, but when the
actual merits of the position are uncovered, is revealed to be merely
peripheral. According to Judge Birch, the essential function of the
position in Jackson was that the work be completed. 95 If the employee
was able to do this with the aid of a reasonable accommodation, then he

86. Id. at 378.
87. 22 F.3d 277 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 657 (1994).
88. Id. at 281 (Birch, J., dissenting).

89. Id. at 279-80.
90. Id. at 283 (Birch, J., dissenting).

91. Id. See Purvis v. United States Postal Serv., No. 01921624 (Aug. 19, 1992), cited in
Walton v. Runyon, Appeal No. 01934642, 1994 WL 744449, at *3 (E.E.O.C. June 14, 1994)
(holding that if attendance is deemed to be an essential job function, any disabled employee with

frequent absences would be considered unqualified and no reasonable accommodation must be
made). But cf. Walton v. Runyon, Appeal No.01934642, 1994 WL 744449, at *3 (E.E.O.C. June

14, 1994) (holding that where the employer is unaware of the employee's disabling condition, after
the employee is penalized for frequent absences, the employer cannot be found to have discriminated
against the individual).
92. Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 281 (11th Cir.) (Birch, J., dissenting), cert.
dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 657 (1994).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 283.
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must be considered a qualified individual with a handicap.16 Is this not
the very result that Congress intended when enacting the policy of the
ADA?97 Jackson provides another classic example of a disabled
American who wanted to work but was stymied by the judicial system.
C.

Undue Hardship

Another avenue available to shield the employer from the mandates
An employer's
of the ADA is the concept of "undue hardship. 'g
legal obligation to provide an employee with a reasonable accommodation depends on "whether [the] accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on" the employer's business. 99 This factor does not come into
play unless the employee or applicant has already been deemed a
This provision, like the
qualified individual with a disability.'
concept of "reasonable accommodation," was meant to be applied and
interpreted consistently with decisions regarding "undue hardship" under
the Rehabilitation Act.' 0 t "Undue hardship," which was originally
intended by Congress to merely limit the employer's monetary contribution, 0 2 has been used as an escape hatch for the employer to avoid
making any contribution at all.'0 3 Thus the "undue hardship" exception
threatens to swallow the rule.1'4
"[U]ndue hardship" means an "action requiring significant difficulty
or expense i.e., an action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial,
disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program."'0 5 The ADA's definition of "undue hardship" is supplemented
by specific factors that are to be used in the calculation of the employer's

96. See S.REp. NO. 116, supra note 4, at 25-26.

97. See S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1994); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 35.

99. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, supranote 3, at 57-58; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(p).
100. See Cooper, supra note 51, at 1441; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
101. H.R.REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 67.
102. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
103. Cooper, supra note 51, at 1450.
104. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (stating that the bona fide occupational qualification [hereinafter BFOQ] defense to
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 threatens to render the statute futile because the majority's
expansive interpretation of the BFOQ defense, in Marshall's words, would likely "swallow the

rule.").
105. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 35; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A); 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(p).
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undue hardship."t 6 These factors include:
(1) the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect
to number of employees, number and type of facilities and size of the
budget;
(2) the type of operation maintained by the covered entity, including
the composition and structure of the entity's workforce; and
(3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 07
An additional aspect of "undue hardship" that is often ignored,
poorly applied, or merely forgotten is the fact that the employer must pay
for the portion of the accommodation that would not cause an undue
hardship.'0 8 Ideally, the ADA effects all employers in an evenhanded
manner by taking all of the previously stated factors into account. It is
certainly possible that Congress had anticipated that agencies or other
similar institutions would take the initiative in this area. 0 9 Congress
even proposed an example of an agency that might be a resource for an
employer or applicant to draw from once the employer pays up to the
amount that would be considered an "undue hardship."" 0.. The committee report mentions the State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency as an
example of an agency that may pay for the cost above what the employer
would be expected to provide."' Congress' foresight here was exquisite, but all of the pieces were not yet put into place.
For the law to affect the marketplace evenhandedly, each employer
confronted with having to make a reasonable accommodation for a
qualified individual with a disability would have to pay the portion of the
accommodation below their undue hardship level which would be
calculated using the many factors involved." 2 Historically, this plan
has failed to materialize. Prior to the enactment of the ADA, courts
applied the concept of "undue hardship" in an inconsistent manner

106. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B); S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
107. S.REP. No. 116, supranote 4, at 36; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
108. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
109. In addition to suggesting possible methods for paying the cost of an accommodation above
the employer's undue hardship, the committee report also provides that where the applicant is willing
to make arrangements to cover the difference, an employer cannot reject an applicant simply because
the employer cannot afford the accommodation. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36. It seems
likely that Congress was preparing for the inevitable transition needed for the ADA to be fully
implemented. This transition is the move from the employee raising the funds for the accommodation to the cost of the accommodation being spread throughout society.
110. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
111. S. REP. No. 116,'supra note 4, at 36.
112. S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
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according to the varying views of the particular judges.1 3 Even today
courts recognize that "undue hardship" can be used to escape liability by
permitting the employer to prove merely "that a disability accommodation reasonable for a normal employer would break him.".... In
practice, employers escape responsibility under the ADA when the cost
of the accommodation reaches a level above the amount that would be
considered an undue hardship by the particular court.11
How are courts to make this determination? Shall the judicial
system decide every issue related to what accommodations constitute an
undue hardship? Potential disaster awaits the court system (both in
overloaded dockets and inconsistent decisions) once substantial numbers
of the handicapped population begin to assert their rights under the ADA,
to battle discrimination, and to obtain the equal opportunities of
employment that have long been denied them. In Barth v. Gelb,tt6 the
court was quite cognizant of the problem the judiciary faces each time
it assesses undue hardship based on cost." 7
Additionally, the current result is unfair to the employer who, in the
court's eyes, can afford a reasonable accommodation. The employer is
in effect being penalized; not for having to hire an employee who
requires an accommodation, but for being successful enough to afford the
accommodation when less successful operations cannot. There is no
doubt that a larger company with a bigger budget could bear the cost of
an accommodation more easily than a smaller company."8 If this is
to be the guide used by the courts in determining which employers are
required to make the same accommodation, it would most certainly lead
113. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicappedand Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1011 n.87 (1984).
.'[U]ndue hardship' seems in practice to have served simply as a label for accommodations that
courts have refused to require in particular cases." Id. at 1011.
114. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995). The court
held that, as a matter of law, it was a reasonable accommodation to allow a disabled employee "to
work at home, at full pay, subject to only a slight loss of sick leave." Id. at 545.
115. Id. at 543; see S.REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
116. 2 F.3d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that denial of an insulin-dependent diabetic's
application for a waiver of a medical clearance requirement did not violate the Rehabilitation Act),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994).
117. In discussing the allocation of the burden of proof under the Rehabilitation Act, the court

noted the difficulty the judiciary has in assessing what constitutes an undue hardship by recognizing
that "a grey area will arise where a proposed accommodation is so costly or of such a nature that
it would impose an undue burden on the employer's operations." Id. at 1187.
118. This inference is reasonable because when determining the employer's undue hardship, the
factfinder must necessarily consider the size of the employer's business with respect to the number

of employees, the number and types of facilities, and the size of the budget. See S.REP. No. 116,
supra note 4, at 35-36.
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to absurd results.
For example, consider this hypothetical: two employers, one a less
efficient, medium sized operation and the other a very efficient, large
operation, are each approached by a qualified individual with a handicap
for employment and both are called upon to make the same accommodation. If the accommodation is an undue hardship for the medium sized
company but not for the large company, the large company will have to
make the accommodation. "9 The problem: what if the only reason the
more efficient company is larger is because the higher level of efficiency
allows it to charge lower prices and in turn sell more products? Now
that the court has decided that only the larger company must provide the
accommodation, the larger company loses its competitive advantage of
lower prices. This would remove the incentive in the marketplace to
become more efficient. This example is obviously grossly oversimplified, but illustrates the potential impact on the economy from awarding
accommodations based on the employer's ability to pay for them.
Additionally, what becomes of the next qualified individual with a
disability who requires a reasonable accommodation once an employer
has expended so much on past accommodations that the employer has
reached the level just under undue hardship? Does the disabled
American who is willing to work then suffer because he or she applied
for the position too late? This result would also be unacceptable.
Courts have grossly misapplied this cutting-edge statute partially as
a result of the limiting constraints imposed by the case law decided under
the Rehabilitation Act 2 and partially as a result of the limited resources for employers to draw from to pay for the accommodations. The
ADA has many potential benefits to society that are going unrealized.
The approach currently followed by the courts is simply not effectuating
the policies of the
ADA and is not putting more disabled employees into
2
the workforce.1 1
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

It is now apparent that there is a major flaw in the implementation
of the ADA. The problem is that the end decision as to which accommodations are "undue hardships" will affect the disabled population
unequally simply because to be able to perform the essential job

119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1994); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 35.

120. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
121. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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functions of a particular position, some handicapped individuals require
more expensive accommodations than others."
A. Using The Social Security Administration
Many ills in society are outside the scope of government intervention. Fortunately, in Helvering v. Davis,123 the Court stated that
unemployment is a condition that Congress may try to tame using the
"resources of the nation." 24 The majority in Helvering used this
reasoning to justify the Social Security Act ("SSA"). t25 The court
stated that "[t]he hope behind [the Social Security Act was] to save men
and women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the
haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is
near."' 126 In Sayers v. Gardner,27 the Sixth Circuit opined that the
SSA was adopted "pursuant to a public policy unknown to the common
law, designed for the protection of society, and enacted to alleviate the
burdens which rest on large numbers of the population because of the
insecurities of modem life, particularly those accompanying old age,
unemployment, and disability."'28 This
hope is further manifested in
129
the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The Social Security Administration is the logical agency to help
subsidize the accommodations that will assist the disabled community in
acquiring the positions they desperately want and need. t30 After its
enactment, the SSA was subsequently expanded to aid the disabled
population as well as the elderly.' 3' An individual was no longer
122. Because the cost of the accommodation as well as the size of the employer are among the
factors to be considered in determining an employer's undue hardship, it appears that Congress
realized the importance these factors would play in the practical application of the ADA. See S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
123. 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the validity of the Social Security tax).

124. Id. at 641.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. 380 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1967). The court held that pain in itself may have been enough to

constitute a disabling impairment and that the plaintiff may have been eligible for benefits. Id. at
948.
128. Id. at 942.
129. See S. REP. No. 116, supranote 4, at 2.
130. The Social Security Act was the logical starting point to attempt to alleviate the problems
of poverty and neglect that were plaguing the elderly and the disabled as a result of their inability
to work. Sayers, 380 F.2d at 942. Once the effects of the Social Security Act manifested, the
setting was right for the beneficiaries of Social Security to take control of their own lives. The
purpose of the ADA is to empower them to do so. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2.
131. Sayers, 380 F.2d at 942.
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required to be a certain age to receive Social Security benefits:' 32 if a
working individual
became disabled, that individual was also eligible to
1 33
benefits.
receive
The SSA was the beginning - it immeasurably improved the
unemployed disabled population's lot in life. The ADA now has the
potential to mainstream these resilient individuals into America's
workforce and let them become productive members of society.'34
This makes the Social Security Administration the logical agency to
support accommodations beyond the employer's means through diversion
of disability benefits.
B.

Why The Social Security Administration Is Needed To Level the
Playing Field

The unequal effect of the ADA on employers and employees arises
as a result of the current unequal treatment of employers under the
ADA.'35 As stated earlier, an employer need not make a reasonable
accommodation if it creates an undue hardship.' 36 Therefore, if a
$5,000 accommodation creates an undue hardship, then the employer
need not make it.'37 The employer is exonerated from making the
accommodation (under the current implementation of the ADA)'38 and
therefore suffers no financial loss. In contrast, a larger employer who
can afford the accommodation without it resulting in an undue hardship
must make the accommodation. 39 While it is true that the larger
employer is better able to financially undertake the accommodation than
the smaller employer, 40 the results are unfair.

132. See id. at 948.
133. McGaha v. Ribicoff, 262 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Del. 1966).

134. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 2.
135. The employer's undue hardship is determined on a case-by-case basis and is wholly
dependent on the specific details of the individual employer's operation. See S. REP. NO. 116, supra

note 4, at 36.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1994); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 35.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 35.
138. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.

139. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
140. This a logical inference based on the inclusion of a company's size as a factor in
determining the employer's undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B); S. REP. No. 116, supra

note 4, at 36.
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C.

The Suggestion

There is an economical way to remedy this situation. The solution
is for the Social Security Administration to subsidize the additional net
costs of an accommodation over and above what would create an undue
hardship on the employer by diverting disability funds from the
individuals to employers to pay for the accommodations. The remainder
of this Note will explain how the subsidy would work, will show how it
is beneficial in the short term, and will show how it offers long term
opportunities for the intended beneficiaries of the ADA.
1. The Provisions
The employer, together with the employee, must apply to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to receive the
subsidy. 4 ' The EEOC is chosen as the forum in the application
process in order to be consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) which makes
filing with the EEOC a prerequisite to sue under the ADA. 42 However, instead of the employee filing a charge of discrimination or an
unlawful employment practice against the employer,143 the employee
and the employer will jointly file a request for a subsidy to fund a
workplace accommodation. 1"
If the Commission turns down the
application for the subsidy, the employee and employer then must make
a good faith effort to find an accommodation that is more cost effective
or they may appeal the decision. Appeals procedures will be consistent
with those presently in place as they relate to unlawful employment
practice claims under the ADA.'4 5
First, to qualify for the subsidy, the employee or potential employee
must be a qualified individual with a handicap consistent with the

141. The EEOC is already one of the governing bodies chosen by Congress to enforce the Act.
42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. V 1994).
142. See Osborn v. EJ. Brach, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that "the
language of § 12117(a) is clear and the procedure is equally sensible in the ADA context as in the
Title VII universe.").
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1990).
144. The application shall be in writing, under oath or affirmation, and shall contain such
information as the Commission requires. See id. All other applicable provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 shall also apply to the application for subsidy.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j).
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meaning of the ADA. 4 6 Second, with the accommodation, the employee must be able to perform the essential job functions of the
position. 4 7 Third, without the accommodation, it must be true that the
employee would not be able to perform the essential job functions of the
position. 48 Finally, the net cost of the accommodation over and above
what would be an undue hardship on the employer may not exceed the
present value of what the employee would receive, if unemployed, in
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration for the
reasonably projected number of years the employee will remain in the
work place as a result of the accommodation.
The first three requirements ensure that the requested accommodation is absolutely essential for the employee to be capable of performing
the necessary requirements of the job. These requirements allow for an
employer to apply to the government for only those absolutely essential
accommodations without which the employee would not be able to work.
These requirements also act as a safety net to keep the individual from
being unemployed because the individual is not employable without the
accommodation. Technically, the subsidy becomes the employer's last
step before refusing to hire or accommodate an individual's particular
disability.
The fourth requirement is a further economic safeguard to ensure
that Social Security subsidies do not get any larger and, as a result,
subsequently decrease. As stated earlier, eighty percent of unemployed
handicapped individuals said that they would give up their benefits to be
able to work."49 This last provision puts that statistic to the test.
Because the subsidy is only available when it is in effect the employee's
last hope of receiving a necessary accommodation, it is reasonable to
infer that the individual would be unemployed but for the accommodation. It is also reasonable to infer that this individual would then collect

146. This requirement is necessary to ensure that the individuals covered under the ADA are the
same individuals who would benefit from this legislation. To require that they be qualified
individuals who are handicapped ensures that they would be capable of performing the job with the
accommodation. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 25-26.

147. This provision further ensures that with the accommodation, the handicapped individual will
be able to perform those functions which are fundamental and not merely marginal. See supranotes
72-73 and accompanying text. This provision also limits the subsidy to essential functions and
provides that an individual cannot receive the subsidy merely to be able to perform some peripheral

function of the position.
148. This provision ensures that this subsidy is provided to the employer as an absolute last
resort. There must be no alternative for the employee to be able to perform the essential job
functions other than the employer providing the accommodation.
149. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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disability benefits from Social Security. Therefore, it becomes no
additional expense over the long term for the Social Security Administration to subsidize the accommodation as long as the accommodation ends
up costing less than the Social Security Administration would pay the
individual in disability benefits.
Requiring the employer to be responsible for the cost of the
accommodation up to the level of that particular employer's undue
hardship ensures that providing accommodations affects all employers
equally.'
Determining the employer's undue hardship is partially a
function of the employer's business and the number of employees the
employer has.' 5 1
Therefore, under the revised regulation, each
employer's undue hardship would be proportionately equal to every other
employer. By making each employer responsible for the cost up to the
t5 2
employer's undue hardship as specifically mentioned in the ADA,
each employer is affected equally.
2.

The Form

The employer will be required to fill out a preprinted form to apply
to the EEOC and request the net cost of the accommodation beyond the
employer's undue hardship.' 53 This net cost will be determined by the
EEOC. On the application itself, there shall be a section to explain the
reason for and nature of the accommodation as well as how the employee
would be able to perform all essential job functions with it and how
these functions could not be performed without it. The exact "essential
job functions" will be determined by the EEOC. Additionally, the form
shall contain a portion dedicated to the computation of the employer's
undue hardship based on a formula which takes into account the size,
Finally, there shall be a
nature, and resources of the employer."
section that computes the net cost of the accommodation over the
employers previously computed undue hardship; i.e., the requested subsidy.

150. The employer ends up paying the same percentage of the undue hardship as another
employer. This provision is the next logical extension to implement the Act as Congress had
2
intended. See S. Rep. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630. (p).
151. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
152. See S. REP. NO. 116, supra note 4, at 36.
153. This is consistent with the fact that the employer must pay for the portion of the
modification up to a level of the employer's undue hardship. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4,

at 36.
154. This portion is dedicated to the factors, that Congress expressly included in the Act, to be

used in computing an employer's undue hardship. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 36; 29
C.F.R. § 1630. 2 (p).
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The employer shall also be required to provide any additional
accompanying documents that the Social Security Administration deems
necessary to make a determination of these factors. These documents
may include, but are not limited to, financial statements and tax returns.
3.

Review

The EEOC shall examine the reasonableness of the accommodation
based on the information contained in the preprinted forms and the
accompanying documents.'55 If the net cost of the accommodation
after deducting the cost of the undue hardship is less than the present
value of the entitlements the employee would receive during the
reasonably calculated amount of time the employee would have had left
in the work force, then the accommodation shall be deemed reasonable
and the employer will receive the requested subsidy for the accommodation. This provision is necessary to ensure that the subsidy never rises
to a level above what the Social Security Administration already entitles
the beneficiary to receive. Alternatively, if the cost of the accommodation after deducting the cost of the undue hardship exceeds the present
value of the entitlements the employee would receive during the
reasonably calculated amount of time the employee would have had left
in the work force, then the subsidy will be denied because it will then no
longer be cost effective for the taxpayer to support. Rejection by the
EEOC because the accommodation is not cost effective does not preclude
the employer and employee from reapplying for a cheaper accommodation. In fact, they must make a good faith effort to either find a less
expensive accommodation or appeal.
D.

Benefits

The potential benefits of legislation consistent with the proposals
contained within this Note are vast. Certainly no legislation can solve
every problem, but these proposals have the potential for America to

155. Undue hardship is now looked at slightly differently in this context. Previously it was only
the undue hardship of the employer that was considered. Now the hardship extends to the
expenditures of the Social Security Administration. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1994).

The Seventh Circuit recently held that undue hardship is meant to be considered in relation to "the
benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker as well as to the employer's resources."
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995). Now, undue

hardship is to be considered in relation not only to the benefits of the disabled worker and the
employer's resources, but also in relation to the employee's prior or potential disability benefits.
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come another step closer to reaching the very noble goals contained in
the policy of the ADA.
1. To the Employer
There is a decreased risk that the employer will pay more than the
employer's undue hardship in an attempt to avoid litigation because the
EEOC would be making these specific calculations to ensure that the
employer
only pays up to the level of that employer's undue hard6
ship.

15

2.

To the Employee

The benefits are obvious but still worth mentioning. Work for
people who want to work. A ladder to climb up from the abyss of
poverty for the poorest minority in America.'5 7 Self respect for a class
of people who have been denied the chance to earn it.
3.

To Future Employees

Situations are conceivable where an employer that is called upon to
make an accommodation using the subsidy from the Social Security
Administration, makes a workplace modification for an employee and the
employee either quits or goes to another employer. There are, however,
two built-in safeguards to minimize the risk of wasted expenditures on
Social Security subsidized workplace modifications that are no longer
necessary. First, if the employee quits and decides to stay home and
collect disability benefits, the government assistance may not be as
readily accessible to that employee now that the Social Security
Administration, (which consequently is the agency funding part of the
accommodation), is aware of that employee's ability to work based on
the EEOC's decision on the reasonableness of the accommodation. The
disability benefits the employee will now receive will reflect the fact that
the employee left a job that the employee was capable of performing.
In the case where the employee leaves to go to another employer, the
Social Security subsidy to make the accommodation at the workplace of
the second employer would be modified as well. The new subsidy

156. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
157. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 9 (quoting President Bush, "[t]he statistics consistently
demonstrate that disabled people are the poorest, least educated and largest minority in America.").
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would reflect the fact that the employee is capable of working based on
the experience with the previous employer and will be taken into account
if the individual attempts to receive disability benefits in the future.
Regardless of whether an employee leaves the employer or stays,
future employees will benefit from the accommodation. Once employers
begin to accommodate employees in their unit, some of these accommodations such as the widening of a doorway or the installation of a ramp
will be permanent. These accommodations will not only benefit the
employees who are the immediate recipients but also any future
employees who may require such accommodations. With some of these
accommodations already in place, some of the reservations an employer
may have about hiring a handicapped individual may be removed.
Although such reservations are often present, discriminating based on
these reservations is, of course, illegal.158 Moreover, more and more
of America's workplaces will become accessible to the country's disabled
workers.
Additionally, an increasing number of requested accommodations
will mean more money to the industries that specialize in producing and
installing these accommodations. This will eventually lead to better
technology for devices that aid the handicapped which will then lead to
more efficient, innovative, and less expensive accommodations for future
employees. Soon it will lead to additional accommodations being
deemed reasonable, and thus, a greater number of handicapped persons
being able to enter the work force.
4.

To Society

The subsidy solution will lead to a more productive society of
workers who want to work which is one of the intended consequences of
the Act.'59 That an unemployed disabled individual who enters the
workforce no longer will need to rely on Social Security disability
6
benefits or Medicare is another intended consequence of the Act.1 1
V.

CONCLUSION

The Americans with Disabilities Act was a further step in the right

158. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
159. 135 CoNG. REC. S10791 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole)

160. Id. (stating that "[t]he eradication of discrimination in employment against persons with
disabilities will result in a stronger work force and lessen dependency on the welfare system.").
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direction to mainstream America's handicapped population into the
nation's workforce. During a Senate proceeding, it was predicted that the
ADA "will ensure that we fully utilize the potential talents of every
individual within our society." 161 The ADA has proven to be significant in fostering the inclusion of disabled Americans into the workforce.
Unfortunately, the results have fallen short of the intended outcome.
Courts have carved out several exceptions for employers to continue
to discriminate against disabled Americans. One loophole allows
employers to refuse to hire disabled Americans who are not as convenient to accommodate as are those individuals whose disabilities require
accommodations that are less than an "undue hardship" on the employer. 162 Another escape hatch grants courts broad discretion to label
accommodations substantial, thus making it unnecessary for an employer
to make the modification. 63 Additionally, with respect to what is an
"essential job function," courts have tended to lack the proper level of
scrutiny when determining what tasks are actually essential to a particular
position thus excluding otherwise qualified individuals from performing
a job that they would be perfectly capable of performing with a
reasonable accommodation. 1'6 These outcomes do not achieve the
American that was intended when
level of opportunity for every disabled
16
the ADA was originally enacted. 1
No law can be perfect at inception, and the ADA is no exception.
The ADA, like any statute, needs to be fine-tuned to reach all intended
beneficiaries. If a law does not accomplish what has been intended by
the legislature, it should not be left to the courts to effectuate a
nonexistent policy, but rather it should be revised and updated until it is
being applied in the way that was originally intended.
Although the ADA has only been in effect since 1992,166 it is
apparent that it needs to be revised so the outcome reflects the original
policy of the Act. 67 Just as the ADA was the perfect complement and
logical next step to the Social Security Act, these suggested amendments

161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 114.
163. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
165. 135 CONG. REC. S10790-91 (1989) (noting that the intended consequence of the ADA was
to "expand [ ] civil rights so that they embrace every American.').
166. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 307 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994)) (section 108 provides, "This title shall
become effective 24 months after the date of enactment."). The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990.

Id.
167. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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will help the nation come even closer to bringing a brave class of
Americans into the mainstream of the workforce and eventually into the
mainstream of society.
Ben Cristal
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